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C A N A D I A N  W A R  M U S E U M
The Loss of a Canadian Chinook in Afghanistan
The Pilot’s Recollection of 5 August 2010
C R A I G  L E S L I E  M A N T L E
Abstract: A Canadian Chinook received heavy enemy fire on 5 August 
2010 near Ma’sum Ghar. Relying on his experience, training, and ability, 
Captain William Todd Fielding, the pilot, safely landed the burning 
helicopter, thereby saving everyone on board. His recollection of the 
event, in his own words, offers a first-person account of what could easily 
have become Canada’s worst day in Afghanistan. For his actions, he was 
awarded the Medal of Military Valour.
Resume: Le 5 aout 2010, un Chinook des Forces canadiennes a subi 
un tir ennemi soutenu pres de Ma’sum Ghar. Fort de son experience, 
de sa formation et de son habilete, le pilote, le capitaine William Todd 
Fielding, est parvenu a atterrir l ’helicoptere en feu, sauvant ainsi la vie 
de toutes les personnes a bord. Son recit des evenements nous fournit 
un compte rendu tres personnel d’un incident qui aurait pu constituer la 
pire journee du Canada en Afghanistan. Son action lui a valu la Medaille 
de la vaillance militaire.
T
h e  C a n a d i a n  h e l i c o p t e r  f o r c e  (Afghanistan) (c h f (a )) 
played an essential role in Canada’s war in Southwest Asia. 
Consisting of six CH-147D Chinooks purchased from the u s  Army 
to ferry troops and supplies throughout southern Afghanistan and 
eight modified CH-146 Griffons to provide escort protection and 
occasional fire support to troops on the ground, the c h f (a ) helped
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Before: U ndoubtedly the last photograph taken o f  Blow torch 61, snapped about five m inutes 
prior to take off. [Courtesy o f Capt. W.T. Fielding]
a lle v ia t e  s o m e  o f  th e  t h r e a t  p o s e d  t o  C a n a d ia n  so ld ie rs  in  a n d  
a r o u n d  K a n d a h a r  P r o v in c e . T a b le d  in  e a r ly  2008 a n d  o th e r w is e  
k n o w n  a s  th e  M a n le y  R e p o r t ,  th e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P a n e l  o n  C a n a d a ’s  
F u t u r e  R o l e  i n  A f g h a n i s t a n  m a d e  th e  a c q u is it io n  o f  h e lic o p te rs  a  
c o n d itio n  o f  C a n a d a ’s c o n tin u e d  in v o lv e m e n t in  c o m b a t, so  d e a d ly  
h a d  in s u r g e n t  a t t a c k s  b e c o m e .1 T h e  p a n e l ’s re c o m m e n d a tio n , t o  b e  
su re , w a s  in  n o  w a y  u n r e a s o n a b le . B e tw e e n  th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  m is s io n  in  
2 0 0 1 a n d  th e  e n d  o f  2008, n in e ty - th r e e  C a n a d ia n  so ld ie rs  w e r e  k il le d  
in  a c tio n ; o f  th is  n u m b e r, f u l ly  s ix ty - f iv e , o r r o u g h ly  70  p e r c e n t  o f  th e  
t o ta l ,  w e r e  c a u s e d  b y  im p r o v is e d  e x p lo s iv e  d e v ic e s  (i e d  s), ro a d s id e  
b o m b s  o r s u ic id e  b o m b e rs  in  o n e  fo rm  o r a n o th e r .2 A c c o r d in g  to  
n o w -C o lo n e l R o b e r t  W a lk e r , i e d  s c a u s e d  a ll  o f  th e  e ig h te e n  fa t a l  
c a s u a lt ie s  s u s ta in e d  b y  h is  b a t t le  g ro u p , w h ic h  w a s  b a s e d  o n  th e  2 n d
1 The report was named after its chair, The Honourable John Manley, PC , and now 
OC. Canada, I n d e p e n d e n t  P a n e l  o n  C a n a d a ’s F u tu r e  R o le  in  A fg h a n is ta n  (Ottawa: 
2008), 27, 35, and 38.
2 As calculated using N a tio n a l P o s t , “Timeline: Death toll in Afghanistan,” available 
online, last accessed 5 December 2014. See also Canada, DND, “Canadian Forces’ 
Casualty Statistics (Afghanistan),” Fact Sheet, Project number FS 12.002, 10 June 
2013. Canadian casualties for the entire mission in Afghanistan, 2001-2014, totalled 
158 military personnel, one diplomat, one journalist, and two civilian aid workers.
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Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, between February and 
August 2007.3 Although the helicopters did not completely negate 
the threat posed by insurgents and their asymmetric tactics—  
Canadian soldiers continued to perish as a result of these weapons 
right up until the end of the combat mission— their use substantially 
minimised the number of required road convoys, something that in 
turn undoubtedly saved many lives but which is naturally impossible 
to prove. In the words of Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad, whose 
National Support Element supplied Task Force Orion, the Canadian 
battle group in Kandahar in 2006, helicopters were “the safest and 
most sensible way to move about in southern Afghanistan.”4 Over 
the course of approximately thirty-one months, from January 2009 
when the helicopters made their first operational flights to July 2011 
when flying operations (and Canada’s combat mission) ceased, the 
Chinooks moved slightly more than seven million pounds of cargo 
and just under 90,000 passengers; the Griffons, whose primary role 
was not transport, nevertheless moved more than 20,000 pounds of 
cargo and more than 2,000 passengers.5
Although the c h f (a ) helped minimise the threat to ground forces, 
movement by air presented its own unique risks and challenges, not 
the least of which were armed insurgents on the ground. Apparently 
using a mix of both small and large calibre weapons, the Taliban shot 
down a Canadian Chinook on 5 August 2010. The helicopter— tail 
number 147202, call sign Blowtorch 61 (pronounced “six one”)— took 
a number of rounds in one of its fuel tanks that, in turn, started an 
intense fire and caused considerable immediate damage to the flight 
controls. With time evaporating as quickly as the fuel was burning, 
the pilot, Captain William Todd Fielding, gently landed the stricken 
helicopter on terra firma, allowing everyone on board to make a safe 
and hasty exit. For his actions that day, he received the Medal of 
Military Valour (m m v ), the third highest military valour decoration
3 C a n a d ia n  W ar M u s e u m  [ C W M ], George Metcalf Archival Collection, oral history 
interview with Colonel Robert Daren Keith Walker, 31D15 Walker.
4 Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad, W h a t th e  T h u n d e r  S a id :  R e fle c t io n s  o f  a 
C a n a d ia n  O ff ic e r  in  K a n d a h a r  (Kingston and Toronto: Canadian Defence Academy 
Press and Dundurn Press, 2009), 20. For additional comments pertaining to the 
value of the Chinooks in Afghanistan, see CWM, George Metcalf Archival Collection, 
oral history interview with Major Darryl Adams, 31D15 Adams.
5 Canada, DND, “Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air W ing Closeout Ceremony,” 
CEFCO M  NR 11.011, 18 August 2011.
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in  th e  C a n a d ia n  H o n o u rs  S y s te m , r a n k in g  b e h in d  th e  V ic t o r ia  C r o s s  
a n d  th e  S t a r  o f  M i l i t a r y  V a lo u r . H is  c ita t io n  re a d s:
On August 5, 2010, Captain Fielding’s Chinook helicopter was struck by 
enemy fire, in Panjwayi, Afghanistan, causing the fuel tank to explode 
and rendering the aircraft nearly inoperable. With the helicopter in 
flames and the cockpit rapidly filling with smoke, Captain Fielding 
made the time-critical decision to land in enemy territory rather than 
fly to a friendly landing zone. His outstanding courage and devotion to 
duty allowed him to execute an emergency landing and then lead the 
evacuation of the burning aircraft. His actions no doubt saved the lives 
of all crew and passengers that day.6
B lo w t o r c h  61 is n o w  th e  la te s t  C a n a d ia n  a ir c r a f t  t o  b e  lo s t  d u e  
to  h o s tile  fire . U n til  A fg h a n is t a n ,  B u f fa lo  1 1 5 4 6 1  h e ld  t h a t  d u b io u s  
h o n o u r. In  A u g u s t  19 74 , S y r ia n  s u r fa c e - to - a ir  m is s ile s  d e s tr o y e d  
th is  de H a v illa n d  D H C - 5  ( C C - 1 1 5 )  t h a t  w a s  f ly in g  fo r th e  U n ite d  
N a tio n s  E m e r g e n c y  F o rc e  II , a  p e a c e k e e p in g  m is s io n  t h a t  m o n ito r e d  
th e  c e a s e fir e  b e tw e e n  Is r a e l a n d  E g y p t  fo llo w in g  th e  e n d  o f  th e  Y o m  
K ip p u r  W a r . T h is  in c id e n t, in  w h ic h  a ll  n in e  c r e w  a n d  p a s s e n g e rs  
w e re  k ille d , s ta n d s  a s  th e  g r e a t e s t  s in g le  lo ss  o f  life  in  C a n a d a ’s lo n g  
h is t o r y  o f  p e a c e k e e p in g .
W it h  s ix  c r e w  m e m b e rs , t h ir t e e n  C a n a d ia n  s o ld ie rs  a n d  tw o  
u s  c iv il ia n s  on  b o a r d  B lo w t o r c h  6 1 , 5 A u g u s t  2010  c o u ld  v e r y  w e ll 
h a v e  b e c o m e  C a n a d a ’s w o r s t  d a y  in  A fg h a n is t a n  in  a  m e re  m a tt e r  o f  
s e c o n d s . A n  e erie  c o in c id e n c e  i l lu s tr a te s  ju s t  h o w  c a ta s t r o p h ic a l ly  it 
a l l  c o u ld  h a v e  e n d e d : e x a c t ly  o n e  y e a r  la te r, o n  6 A u g u s t  2 0 1 1 , a  u s  
C h in o o k  w a s  sh o t d o w n  in  A fg h a n is t a n ,  in  th e  T a n g i  V a lle y  o f  W a r d a k  
P r o v in c e , k il l in g  a ll  t h ir t y - e ig h t  o n  b o a r d .7 O th e r  in c id e n ts  c la im e d  
a d d it io n a l liv e s  to o . A  C a n a d ia n  G r iffo n , fo r in s ta n c e , c r a s h e d  o n  6
6 C a n a d a  G a z e tte , Part I, Vol. 146, No. 6 (11 February 2012), 178. See also C a n a d ia n  
M ilita r y  J o u r n a l, “Valour,” Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 2012), 6. Many newspapers 
devoted attention to Fielding and his actions. For some representative examples 
taken from online editions, see “ Soldiers’ and pilot’s valour recognized for actions 
in Afghanistan,” T o r o n to  S ta r , 26 January 2012; “Praising Capt. Will Fielding for 
his courage under fire,” N ia g a r a  F a l ls  R e v iew , 9 March 2011; and “Borden Air Force 
member honoured as a ‘hero,’ ” B a r r ie  E x a m in e r , 25 February 2011, all last accessed 
on 4 December 2014.
7 Thirty Americans; eight Afghans. Ray Rivera, Alissa J. Rubin and Thom Shanker, 
“Deadliest Day of Afghan War for U.S. Forces,” T h e  N e w  Y o r k  T im e s , 7 August 
2011, A 1.
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J u ly  2009 a ft e r  c lip p in g  a  s e c u r it y  w a ll  a t  a  fo r w a r d  o p e r a t in g  b a s e  
(f o b ) in  Z a b u l  P r o v in c e , k il l in g  tw o  C a n a d ia n  n o n -c o m m is s io n e d  
m e m b e r s  a n d  o n e  B r it is h  o ffice r. A c c id e n t s  w e r e  e q u a lly  a s  d e a d ly . 
O n  2 S e p te m b e r  2006, a  R o y a l  A i r  F o rc e  N im r o d  re c o n n a is s a n c e  
a ir c r a f t  c r a s h e d  in  H e lm a n d  P r o v in c e , k i l l in g  a ll  fo u r te e n  o n  b o a r d . 
T h e  p r o x im a l c a u s e  o f  th e  in c id e n t, so  th e  o ffic ia l in q u ir y  co n c lu d e d , 
w a s  a  fire  d u r in g  m id -a ir  r e fu e llin g , b u t th e  d is t a l  c a u s e  w a s  a  c u ltu r e  
w ith in  th e  a ir  fo rce  a t  th e  t im e  t h a t  p r io r it is e d  b u d g e t a r y  s a v in g s  
o v e r  a ir  w o r th in e s s , c o u p le d  w ith  s y s te m ic  fa il in g s  on  th e  p a r t  o f  tw o  
c o m p a n ie s  t h a t  w e re  re s p o n s ib le  fo r a n  e a r lie r  s a f e t y  r e v ie w  o f  th e  
N im r o d  f le e t .8 F ly in g  in  A fg h a n is t a n  d id  n o t co m e  w ith o u t  r is k s .
O v e r  t h e  p a s t  y e a r -a n d -a -h a lf , t h e  C a n a d ia n  W a r  M u s e u m ’s o ra l 
h is t o r y  p r o g r a m  h a s  c o n tin u e d  to  c o lle c t  p o w e r fu l a n d  e m o tiv e  
s to r ie s  fro m  C a n a d ia n  v e t e r a n s — p r in c ip a lly  r e la t in g  t o  t h e  w a r  in  
A fg h a n is t a n — in  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  u p c o m in g  r e d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  la s t  
p o r t io n  o f  its  p e r m a n e n t  g a lle r y , A Violent Peace: The Cold War, 
Peacekeeping, and Recent Conflicts, 1945 to the Present. C a p t a in  
F ie ld in g  d e s c r ib e d  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  on  5 A u g u s t  20 10  in  a n  in te r v ie w  
fo r  th e  m u s e u m , fo r  t h is  p u r p o s e .9 H is  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  e v e n t , fro m  
s t a r t  to  fin is h  a n d  in  h is  o w n  w o r d s , is p r e s e n te d  h e r e .10 H e  re c a lls :
On 5 August 2010, I was scheduled to fly a mission called ‘Maholic,’
a phrase we used for supply runs between different forward operating
8 Richard Norton-Taylor, “R A F  Nimrod air crash investigation delivers devastating 
verdict,” T h e  G u a r d ia n , 28 October 2009, online edition, last accessed 5 December 
2014. For the official report, see Charles Haddon-Cave, QC, T h e  N im r o d  R e v iew :  
A n  in d e p e n d e n t rev iew  in to  th e  b ro a d er is s u e s  su r r o u n d in g  th e  lo s s  o f  th e  R A F  
N im r o d  M R 2  A ir c r a ft  X V 2 3 0  in  A fg h a n is ta n  in  2 0 0 6  (London: The Stationery 
Office, October 2009).
9 The full, unedited interview can be found at C W M ,  George M etcalf Archival 
Collection, oral history interview with Captain William Todd Fielding, 31D15 
Fielding.
10 The following narrative has been approached and edited in the same manner as 
the chapters that appear in Craig Leslie Mantle e t al., eds., I n  T h e ir  O w n  W ords: 
C a n a d ia n  S to r ie s  o f  V a lo u r  a n d  B r a v e r y  fr o m  A fg h a n is ta n , 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 7  (Kingston: 
CD A  Press, 2013), that is, with only minor changes being made to the text in the 
interest of clarity and flow; Captain Fielding had two opportunities to review and 
comment on this article before it was submitted to C a n a d ia n  M ili ta r y  H is to r y  for 
publication.
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bases, moving different troops and equipment around. Today’s mission 
would consist of one Chinook, call sign Blowtorch 61, and two Griffon 
helicopters, call signs Shakedown 30 and Shakedown 31. I was, being 
the aircraft captain on the Chinook, the AMC, or airborne mission 
commander, so I was in charge of that three-ship element. The aircraft 
captain on one of the supporting aircraft was actually the air wing 
commander, Colonel Christian Drouin, who would be flying as one 
of the pilots, which made it unique because he tried to fly when he 
could and it was always nice having him ‘on board’ because he’s a very 
experienced and seasoned pilot.11
Weather that day was typical, low forties Celsius, light winds and very 
little cloud cover. We were launching at approximately nine-thirty in 
the morning, and it was just about a four- to five-hour mission, which 
was pretty standard, with a couple of refueling stops in the middle. We 
also had a passenger that day. It was Captain C.F. Campbell who was a 
flight surgeon from 408 Squadron, and he was in theatre on a visit prior 
to actually deploying, where he came into theatre for two weeks just to 
get a sense of what was going on, and lo and behold, he happened to be 
on our trip that day. And he would be flying in the jump seat, which is 
a seat that drops down between and just behind the pilot and co-pilot’s 
seat, so he was upfront in the cockpit, just a few feet behind us, so he 
could see what was going on. We started the trip flying a slung load 
... taking a generator, it was about 10,000 pounds, up to a FOB in the 
northeast. It’s a bit of a longer flight. We dropped that off, and then we 
returned for more troops and equipment, back to Kandahar [Airfield, 
KAF]. And then from there we proceeded to fly out to multiple FOBs 
and back. During one of the refueling stops, we were told our mission 
had changed, we were going to be transporting a detainee, or pow 
[prisoner of war] if you will, from one of the FOBs to Kandahar. So 
we altered our mission and who was on board, because we didn’t want 
to land and have troops on board when there was a detainee being 
brought on board with escort personnel. . It always seems to take 
forever when you’re on the ground because the escort personnel have 
to sign paperwork to transfer these detainees. We couldn’t get off the 
ground soon enough, we were getting very antsy, I always remember 
that. And we finally got him on board, and got him back to Kandahar, 
and proceeded with the rest of our mission.
11 Christian Drouin is now a brigadier-general, OMM, M SC, CD.
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The latter stages of the mission involved landing at FOB Ma’sum Ghar, 
which is on the side of a ghar, or small mountain if you will, where we 
dropped off some personnel, picked up some personnel. ... And it was 
in the volatile Panjwayi District, which is near what we coined the 
‘Green Zone,’ which is where the majority of the insurgents are believed 
to have their strongholds. And while en route to the FOB ... I lowered 
my head to conduct a pre-landing check a few kilometres back from 
the FOB to set-up for arrival, and then I heard a very large ‘Bang!’ 
followed by an explosion on the aircraft. The whole aircraft shuddered. 
Now, for something to hit a Chinook and cause it to shudder, being a 
twenty tonne helicopter with all our weight in it, it had to be something 
significant. ... Small arms, you could get hit with bullets in the aircraft, 
you wouldn’t even know it happened. It’s almost like a bug hitting your 
car. . At that point I didn’t know if something had hit us or if we had 
hit something, because we were flying low-level. I immediately looked 
up. The aircraft had shifted its flight path to the right— something 
had struck us on the left side, which was very obvious, shifted us right 
and caused us to yaw left. So it had hit, I knew at that point, the back 
rear side of the helicopter. A wall of smoke and shrapnel went across 
the windscreen. I could see bits of metal as we flew through them and 
it settled. We flew through our own shrapnel. The aircraft immediately 
began filling with smoke. The airflow in the Chinook, with the ramp 
and the door guns, comes in the tail and goes out the pilots’ front 
windows. Because we fly windows down, there’s no air conditioning of 
course, all the smoke was being directed up to the cockpit.
I immediately took control of the aircraft. It’s based on experience, 
because I had a lot more experience than my co-pilot [Captain A.J.W. 
Mramor] did. Instinctively I took control of the aircraft which, given the 
situation, is usually the right thing to do and have your co-pilot back 
you up. So, something we normally brief, on missions, is, pending the 
experience of the crew, if the aircraft captain has a lot more experience 
than the co-pilot or first officer, he would assume control of the aircraft.
I’ll never forget the blood-curdling screams. I could hear lots of screaming 
coming from the back of the aircraft, as well as on the intercom system 
through our helmets— that’s how we communicate in the aircraft. I’ll 
never forget that day . just constant screaming and chaos, the aircraft 
filling with smoke up front in the cockpit. The flight controls were not 
functioning normally; the cyclic, which is the stick between our legs
7
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that we control the rotor disks with, was shaking violently. The controls 
were feeling sluggish. So as I gave an input to keep the aircraft upright, 
it was taking a long time for that input to make it to the control so 
that we could get that sense [of movement]. Grasping what was going 
on, it was very obvious that we were on fire, given all the black smoke 
in the cockpit. The caution panel in the cockpit lit up. I had low fuel 
indications and master cautions from the left side. I knew that whatever 
hit us took out our auxiliary main fuel tanks on the left side. We didn’t 
have a lot of fuel, though it wasn’t a big concern at the time and the 
fuel itself may have been igniting the fire at that point.
We were on fire. There was chaos. I suspected injury in the back. I 
suppose there would have been eighteen personnel in the back, including 
our crew and our door gunners. ... So I knew there was likely injury in 
the back, but I didn’t know to what extent at that point. All I knew 
was, as the aircraft captain, I had to get that aircraft on the ground. We 
couldn’t fly anywhere while we were on fire because we likely wouldn’t 
make it. I knew we were probably about a twenty- to twenty-five-minute 
flight from Kandahar Airfield, so that wasn’t an option. Going back to 
the FOB we were at really wasn’t an option either. This was a decision. 
I knew before things got out of hand I had to land, immediately. So 
I began scanning, looking for a place to land. I was having difficulty 
seeing through the black smoke, it was so thick in the cockpit. I was 
peeking my head out my side window as best as I could, looking for 
an area to land. Unfortunately, it wasn’t a desert area, like it would 
have been nice to have, where there are lots of good places to land; it 
was fairly built-up. And built-up there means lots of mud huts, lots of 
vegetation and whatnot. And it’s always in pockets and we were over 
one of those pockets.
So I was looking for the best location I could for us to land. I looked 
over at the FOB that we were trying to go to, which was a couple of 
miles away still. I wasn’t thinking about making the FOB because you 
have to be very careful going in and out of those, because the landing 
areas are very small. But all around the FOB— it was on the side of a 
ghar— was open territory. Initially I thought, ‘Well, I should probably 
try to go there because it is fairly open.’ However I quickly decided 
that I’m not going to try to extend the flight an extra couple of miles, 
because that extra two minutes may prove to be an unwise decision. By 
scanning around I was able to find what looked like an open farmer’s
8
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field, and it was probably six or seven hundred metres away to my one 
o’clock position. So I started turning and decelerating the aircraft to 
set-up for that, for that field. I would find out later that it was a good 
decision that we didn’t go for that area near the ghar because those 
were un-cleared minefields from the Afghanistan-Russia war, way back, 
so that could have proved fatal within itself.12
So I selected a field. I told my co-pilot, Captain Mramor, that I was 
going to be landing in the field at one o’clock. He probably didn’t know 
which field I was talking about immediately, but he would learn it later 
as we set-down upon final. I started slowing the aircraft and descending 
from our 100 feet as best I could, to try and set-up for an approach 
in. I yelled to Adam [Captain Mramor], through all the chaos, to get a 
‘Mayday’ call out, just to let the Griffons know that we had been hit 
and we were going down. And I could hear him vaguely doing it in the 
background. But I was experiencing tunnel vision and tunnel hearing at 
that time as I remember, and it was a bit surreal. So I knew there was 
chaos going on around me. It reminded me of movies I’d watched where 
you’d hear someone whispering to themselves when you can hear all the 
chaos in the background as they try to focus. And that’s kind of what 
I was doing, was really trying to focus, you know, encompass all the 
training and all the experience I had to try to keep the aircraft upright 
because it wasn’t flying properly and to try and get it down safely so 
that we didn’t have what would have been the worst day in Canadian 
military history in Afghanistan ... if I had botched that landing and 
twenty-one people died!
I was concentrating on trying to get that aircraft down, controlling my 
airspeed and keeping the aircraft upright. ... And then as I started to 
set-up on final approach, I yelled to Captain Mramor, I actually yelled 
on the intercom system, ‘Emergency landing! Emergency landing!’ I 
just wanted everybody in the back who would hear on the intercom to 
know— especially our flight engineers and gunners, they would hear it 
on the intercom— that we’re landing, we’re going down, so that they 
would do what’s required, whether it’s get in a brace position or get on 
the floor. Once again, not being in the back, I didn’t know what was 
going on, but at least they could brace themselves for what could be 
an impact.
12 Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan for a decade, from late 1979 until the late 1980s.
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I remember Captain Mramor said to me, ‘You’re going to land in that 
field?’ Because it wasn’t a perfect field. And my response to him was, 
‘Dude, we’re on fire. We have to land now.’ You know, there weren’t 
a lot of good choices around, it was the most favourable choice in my 
mind. What the field was was a plowed farmer’s field, so there were 
rows of dirt that were about two feet high, and we were landing parallel 
to those rows of dirt. I was going to try and put the aircraft down 
in between them. Some farmer had probably taken whatever type of 
equipment he had and dug little trenches and patted them in with 
dirt. It was like little rows of dirt. The field looked like it was probably 
about 100 or 150 yards long, so it was a decent size. But I also noticed 
as we were coming in to land that, at the end of the field, the rows of 
dirt that were paralleling turned perpendicular. So I really wanted to 
get that aircraft stopped before they turned perpendicular and we went 
over them.
Going down, I thought, ‘Boy, I can’t believe this is happening because 
once we get this aircraft down on the ground— if and when we get it 
down on the ground and stopped— the day is far from over because 
of where we are. We are in enemy territory in a volatile district in 
Afghanistan, and things are going to get more interesting before they 
are going to get more boring.’ So that was going through my mind on 
the way down. I remember that distinctively while I was dealing with 
the tunnel hearing and the tunnel vision. I had greyed out a little bit. I 
was really focusing straight ahead.
I brought the aircraft in. Captain Mramor was backing me up at the 
controls. Surprisingly, we touched down at what I estimated at the time 
at fifteen to twenty knots, so probably about twenty-five miles an hour, 
could have been a bit faster. The rear wheels touched down first. And 
this is where it’s nice having a wheeled aircraft versus a skidded aircraft 
like the Griffon ... it allowed us to land and keep moving as we tried 
to bring the aircraft to a stop, which is a lot more comfortable than 
if you have skis or skids on an aircraft. So, we touched down in what 
seemed like it was a fairly smooth landing actually and slowly lowered 
the collective [power], got the front of the aircraft down, touched that 
down, again very smooth. ... I just yelled out, ‘Emergency shutdown! 
Emergency shutdown!’ for Captain Mramor, which was his indication 
to get the fire handles pulled, which cut fuel to the engines, and to get 
the engine throttles to the off position. In other words, it’s like shutting
10
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it off. It’s like if you slam the brakes in a car and shut it off as quick as 
you can, that’s what we were trying to do with the aircraft. We got the 
rotor blades stopped as quick as we could too.
So I got the aircraft down on the ground, immediately applied the 
brakes as best I could while he did his emergency shutdown. We did get 
the aircraft to a near stop, but lo and behold, we hit those perpendicular 
dirt mounds. I remember the aircraft lurching up back into the air, 
like going over a speed bump too fast. I believe that’s when Captain 
Mramor and I hit our heads on the canopy above us, which was later 
to cause some injury. The aircraft, though, did come back down and 
kind of buried in the dirt at that point and came to a stop. And at 
that point the rotor blades were slowly coming to a stop because of the 
emergency shutdown. And at that point it was, you know, you didn’t 
have to tell people what to do, however I did yell on the intercom, 
‘This is an emergency egress!’ or ‘Everybody out!’ ... You don’t have 
to tell people that in a crisis situation! If there’s a fire in the building, 
everybody knows to run and get away. I said it instinctively, however 
I don’t think it was necessary. At that point it was more or less every 
person for themselves, to try and get out of the aircraft in as orderly a 
fashion as possible.
For myself, it meant getting out my emergency exit, which was the 
door on my right side. . So I remember pulling my emergency handle. 
The way it works on a Chinook, if you can picture it, is if you took a 
piece of metal or a door, and you bent it ever so slightly, and pushed 
it in place somewhere, you would know that if you pull that handle, it 
would want to release that tension and pop off. So that’s what I was 
expecting. We’d never done egress drills on the Chinook before because 
of that design. In a Griffon, we would do them, because I could pull a 
handle and actually hold the door and drop it off. In the Chinook, you 
never did it because, in theory, you pull that handle, you’re releasing it; 
it’s almost like releasing an elastic band, you’re going to shoot the door 
out the side, because it’s under tension, it’s squeezed into that airframe.
So I pulled the handle, nothing happened. . I hit it with my elbow, 
kind of forced my way into it, and nothing happened again. I hit it 
with my shoulder, the door didn’t come off. I thought, ‘You’ve got to 
be kidding me.’ ... I remember looking at it for a split second. We have 
armour plating on the sides of our seats as well, ballistic armour plating
11
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After: Blow torch 61 reduced to a m ere stain on the sand. O n ly  the transm issions and  parts o f 
the rotor blades cou ld  later be positively identified. Canadian and A fghan  soldiers lo o k  on as 
the C h in o o k  continues to sm oulder. [Courtesy o f  Capt. W.T. Fielding]
to prevent rounds from hitting us, and looking at the space between the 
armour plating and the room of the door, I thought, ‘That’s going to be 
a very tight fit anyway if I do get the door off.’ I always wondered how 
I’d fit through there. Adrenaline would normally carry you, but we were 
flying with [a lot of personal equipment on]. I was pretty freaking heavy. 
We were about ninety pounds of equipment when we flew. And I’m 
thinking, in a split second, ‘I’m not sure I’d fit through there anyway. 
I’m not going to force this issue. I’m going back through the middle. 
I’m going to go out through the fuselage of the aircraft [which is how we 
enter and exit the aircraft under normal circumstances].’
Captain Mramor on my other side was able to get his exit off, and 
he, I later was told by him, basically looked out and saw nobody and 
thought, ‘Well, I’m not going to go out there and be by myself on the 
left-side of the aircraft, because obviously everybody is going the other 
way.’ So he looked over to me and saw me climbing through the centre 
console to get out, because the doctor, Doctor Campbell, had already 
left; he had been grabbed by the guys in the back and brought through, 
which vacated the way for Captain Mramor, who would follow me, to
12
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climb through the centre. So I climbed over the jump seat, I turned, and 
Captain Mramor handed me my C8 assault rifle.
That was the first time that I could get a sense of what was happening 
at the back of the aircraft. The whole back was engulfed in flames, it 
was all black, it looked like at least a third of the back of the aircraft 
was on fire, and it looked like it was moving forward quickly. All the 
troops were rushing out the door as fast as they could, in a somewhat 
orderly fashion. It kind of reminded me of the movie Titanic ... ‘it’s time 
to abandon ship, let’s get everybody off, and as the crew we’re letting 
everybody go out in front of us.’ There was no pandemonium. Everybody 
was going in a fairly orderly fashion, albeit quickly. They were sliding 
underneath the mount of the door gun to get out of the aircraft. We 
waited for everybody to get off. I looked in the back because I could 
see where my ‘go bag’ was, my Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape 
bag in the back, which had my extra ammunition, my extra ballistic 
plating, and my bottles of water, and a few rations that I had in there 
that I would like to have on the ground. Seeing that it was fairly close 
to the fire, for a split second I thought, ‘Do I run back there and grab 
it?’ And I remember looking at our door gunner, Master Corporal A. 
Gorrie, and I looked at my bag, and I looked back at him. He would 
later tell me that he thought that I was looking at him saying [with 
my eyes], ‘Go get my bag for me.’ And he was thinking, ‘You’re crazy!’ 
When I found this out later, I said, ‘Oh no, that’s not, that wasn’t it 
at all. I was just looking, you know, with the adrenaline going, I was 
just trying to take account of the situation.’ I just happened to look at 
him, and he thought I was indicating, ‘Yeah, you go get my bag for me,’ 
because he was standing further back in the aircraft; the fire was only 
about twenty feet behind him.
What else was going through my mind? ‘I hope we get off this aircraft 
before it explodes,’ because I knew we still had a lot of fuel on board. 
And my fear was that it would explode and half of us would die in that 
aircraft. So, you know, impatiently, I waited for everybody to get off the 
aircraft, and at the very end it was myself, and Master Corporal Gorrie, 
and Captain Mramor behind me. Master Corporal Gorrie motioned for 
myself and Captain Mramor to get out because he was trying to push 
people with his arm to get under that door mount. At that point, I just 
remember flying underneath the door mount and landing on the ground. 
I turned and looked. Captain Mramor and Master Corporal Gorrie had
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gotten off the aircraft as well, which was good. Right across from us, 
about forty yards away, there was a mud wall. My sense of direction is 
pretty good, and I was pretty sure that whatever brought us down—  
because at that point, I figured we had been shot down, something had 
brought us down— was on the other side of that mud wall, somewhere 
in the distance. How far I didn’t know. So as fast as I could run, I ran 
to that mud wall, because I could see all the other troops had lined 
themselves along the wall, to the right of me, just to basically hunker 
down.
It looked like it was about four feet high. The mud in Afghanistan is 
like concrete. Army personnel had told me you could shoot rounds into 
it and even heavy rounds, like howitzer rounds, won’t go through. They 
build their houses out of this. They’re very strong structures. Anyhow, 
I just ran as fast as I could sprint, adrenaline going, and took up a 
position; I just basically ran right into the mud wall and hunkered down 
like everybody else had. I caught my breath. I realised that we were in 
a really bad situation now! I looked back, I looked across, took account 
of what was going on, and everybody was spread out along the mud 
wall; I looked back at the aircraft and we were only forty or fifty yards 
away from it and the fire was almost up towards the cockpit at that 
point, it was spreading so rapidly. And all I could think about is, ‘If that 
helicopter explodes, and that shrapnel goes everywhere, it’s going to go 
into us, into the mud wall. So we’re in a bad place.’
However, at the same time, I knew there were bad people on the other 
side of that mud wall, so it was a lose-lose [situation] at that point. 
Though I was pretty sure the aircraft would explode, I wasn’t sure what 
was on the other side of the mud wall. I remember saying to Corporal C. 
Hinds, who was beside me, who was one of our door gunners, ‘I think 
we’re in a bad place here!’ You know, yelling to him in the chaos. And 
he said, ‘Yeah I think we are too.’ I said, ‘I think that aircraft might 
explode,’ or he had said it to me. He took the words right out of my 
mouth. ... And then instinctively, I just started screaming, and he did as 
well, ‘Everybody through the mud wall! The aircraft may explode! Get 
through the mud wall!’ There was a low point in the mud wall about ten 
feet from me that was maybe two feet high, so it was almost like a little 
entrance through the mud wall. ... So all the troops started running 
and funneling through the low point in the mud wall. I followed suit at 
some point, and on the other side of the mud wall there was a ditch, it
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was probably two, two-and-a-half feet deep, and it kind of paralleled 
the mud wall, it was like a gutter, so to speak. So I ran off to my left 
and found an open spot and got down in that ditch to try to find some 
type of cover.
And it was less than ideal. I couldn’t hunker down enough in the gutter, 
I was still sticking up well above it. I was lying down in the prone 
position with my rifle. At that point, I had chambered a round and 
put the safety catch on, and so I was looking down my scope, looking 
down range. ... In all the weapons training we had done, we had always 
wore the Kevlar helmet that we fly with in our ‘go bag.’ So in other 
words, whenever you get somewhere on the ground, you want to put 
that Kevlar helmet on, the standard issue for the Canadian military, 
what the army has. We’re wearing flying helmets at that point. And, 
of course, I’m thinking, ‘My helmet’s in my “go bag,” which is, well, 
engulfed in flames, so I’m going to leave my flying helmet on.’ But 
of course, with the flying helmet on, it covers your cheeks. I couldn’t 
actually look through my scope, because you rest the side of your face 
on the butt of your rifle.
So I had decided to keep my flying helmet on. I noticed Master Corporal 
Gorrie had thrown his off, and in discussion later, he had apparently 
decided, ‘Well, it’s not going to offer me much protection anyway, you 
know. It doesn’t have ballistic protection. So I threw it off right away.’ 
My train of thought at the time was, ‘Well, I wasn’t concerned about 
the ballistic protection. It would offer some shrapnel protection, and 
it gave me that sense of comfort; it’s like having that little blanket as 
a kid, it is something that’s wrapped around you and giving you that 
little comfort zone.’ And I kind of saw it as that. As a pilot, I fly with 
it all the time and I did think, though, ‘If rounds are flying around 
me, it would give me some kind of comfort.’ So I elected to keep it on. 
I couldn’t see anything. Adrenaline’s going. Heartbeat was probably 
200 beats per minute at that point looking down range. I couldn’t see 
anything target-wise. I saw some movement, a pick-up truck with some 
personnel that looked pretty shady that was moving up the flank. Some 
of our soldiers took aim at them. I know, as I found out later, that we 
did have rounds coming and hitting the walls around us, but I couldn’t 
get a bead on where it was coming from.
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My first reaction now is, ‘I need to get my emergency radio, our PRCs, 
our personal emergency radios [up and running].’ So I pulled my radio 
out, pulled my antenna on it so I could get a call going, because I 
knew the Griffons were above or around us somewhere, our escorts. I 
wasn’t sure where they were at that point, I couldn’t hear them or see 
them. I was really focusing down range on what threat could be out 
there. And I could only get static on every frequency. So I was calling 
frantically on every frequency, ‘Mayday! Mayday! It’s Blowtorch 61’ and 
I couldn’t get a response. I was only listening to static on the radio, 
and I thought, ‘Ah, this thing’s not working. I’m not going to mess 
with it too much.’ I knew somebody knew where we were because our 
escort aircraft were airborne, so I elected just to put the radio away. I 
knew other individuals had the same response with the radio, it wasn’t 
working properly for them either.
At some point there, with the rounds coming in ... I do distinctly 
remember thinking, ‘I probably won’t see my kids again.’ I was just 
waiting for the ping or that snap in my helmet, of a round hitting me 
and ending everything. So it was a bit of a sad moment, albeit quick; 
just a thought, that this could be the end. For the first time in my 
career, I’m faced with the biggest threat. I was just lying there in the 
ditch thinking, ‘I think I’d rather be in that burning helicopter flying 
again,’ because as a pilot, that’s my comfort zone. At least being in an 
aircraft— it’s not great being on fire— I’ll probably be more comfortable 
than being on the ground. I’m not an infanteer. We do have some 
training with weapons and tactics on the ground, but this is the first 
ground threat that I really faced. And the army personnel we were with 
were probably comfortable now because they were on the ground, and 
getting away from that burning aircraft, but I know as a pilot, I was 
more comfortable in that aircraft.
I remember looking up, and I remember hearing lots of rounds going off. 
What it was, it was behind us, it was rounds cooking-off in the aircraft 
because we had so many rounds on board for the door guns. We started 
hearing rounds go off. And in retrospect, we think that that probably 
helped keep the insurgents at bay, because so many rounds where going 
off it sounded like machine guns. Probably had them spooked, about 
who’s around and who’s doing all this firing.
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I did take note of a major, his name was C. Lillington. He was walking 
around and yelling, barking commands to the army troops. I kind of 
liked that because there was a sense that this was his element and 
he was taking control on the ground. My job was more or less done, 
other than the well-being of everybody there. As the aircraft captain, I 
wanted to make sure everybody was okay and that we were doing the 
right thing. I couldn’t hear him, but he was yelling things and moving 
around the mud wall, and I thought, ‘Who’s this guy walking around?’ 
I couldn’t get any lower in the ditch and my helmet was still sticking 
up. It kind of reminded me of a scene in Apocalypse Now, where Robert 
Duvall [who played the yellow-scarfed and napalm-loving Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bill Kilgore] is walking around, and when the beach is under 
attack, he’s yelling commands and calling in air strikes and everybody’s 
hunkered down. I briefly thought of that. I thought, ‘Wow, this is just 
like Apocalypse Now.’
At some point, and I didn’t have a good appreciation for time at that 
point, too many rounds were coming in around us so we were being 
definitely engaged, and the decision was made to move. And it may 
have been his decision [Lillington’s] that we needed to get out of here. 
We knew we weren’t far from the FOB, so it was time to move. I 
believe he had yelled out, ‘Move to the east!’ ... I turned and saw troops 
starting to move, so I started leopard-crawling into the ditch. And it 
was extremely uncomfortable, I remember, because it was full of rocks 
and . prickly bushes. I remember them pinching through my flight 
suit, and my gloves took a beating, they were getting torn up as I was 
dragging myself, trying to stay low in the ditch, and going over the 
rocks and the dirt. And it was hard-packed, very dry. I did that for a 
while, and at some point I could see where we were going, and I thought 
this is going way too slowly. I elected just to stand up and run. And I 
remember Captain Mramor telling me, as he was in front of me to my 
left, so when we’re crawling he was in front of me, and he said, ‘I saw 
you run by and thought, “Yeah, enough of this, this leopard-crawling.”’ 
So he got up and ran, followed suit with me, as fast as we could run, 
and then we dove in another ditch. We crossed a road and jumped into 
a ditch, and took up position there.
It was at that point I really noticed, it was a little bit earlier I guess, 
that the doctor was beside me, Dr. Campbell, and he didn’t have a 
weapon because he doesn’t fly with a weapon. And I had two weapons,
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and I wasn’t going to offer him one of my weapons, other than the 
fact that I said, ‘Stay with me.’ So when I ran, he ran as well. And 
I basically kind of used my hand and kind of pushed him down to 
stay low, and I got on one knee at that point, because it was kind of a 
protection instinct, where ‘I’m going to look after you.’ And I had my 
rifle on my shoulder looking down range again as other troops came 
across the road. I just wanted him to stay low because he really couldn’t 
defend himself per se. And I knew my nine millimetre pistol probably 
wasn’t going to help him because [the enemy would be too far away for 
it to be effective.] I remember yelling to him, ‘Just stay here, stay low, 
stay with me.’ And so he was down, and the rest of the troops started 
coming across the road. I found out later that a lot of rounds had been 
coming into the mud walls around us and stuff because I still had that 
tunnel vision, tunnel hearing, and the adrenaline was going at a rocket 
pace, so I didn’t notice. I heard somebody yelling, ‘We’re going to go 
to the FOB. Get in a patrol formation.’ My mind is scrambling trying 
to remember what the patrol formation was. ... I really didn’t want to 
look down that road because it made me nervous to look and see if 
something was coming down it, however, that would be the direction 
we’d be going, knowing we were only about a half-hour to an hour away 
from our FOB.
I lost an appreciation of time once again. I’m not sure how long we were 
there with everybody crossing the road. The next thing I remember, 
shortly thereafter, was a vehicle coming down the road. This big 
military vehicle had showed up, and I thought, ‘Oh, now we’re really in 
trouble.’ And I wasn’t appreciating who it could be. All I knew was that 
somebody was here other than us and I didn’t like it. And, of course, 
it turns out it was one of our Canadian vehicles, it was a LAV, a light 
armoured vehicle. And another one showed up, and another one showed 
up, and I got an appreciation for who it was as I saw the troops on 
board. ‘Thank goodness the cavalry is here!’ Like, there’s some support 
there. I was still very confused. It was a crazy situation, making sure 
the doctor was down beside me and stuff.
These vehicles looked like they started to set up a perimeter around us, 
out from where the threat was in the fields. Eventually I noticed the 
first vehicle, it was off to my left. The hatch opened and I saw a few 
troops off to my left running to get in that vehicle. And then somebody 
had come along at one point and yelled, ‘Who are the pilots?’ And
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Captain Mramor and myself were there, and then others said, ‘Hey, 
that’s them there.’ We had the different helmets on obviously. And then 
another vehicle about thirty to forty yards away, its hatch had opened 
... and I can’t remember who it was, said, ‘You and you, run, you guys 
go and get in that vehicle.’ So I remember running for the vehicle. I 
grabbed the doctor and we all ran over, and other troops had run over 
too, and we all climbed in the back of that vehicle. So now we were 
inside this TLAV [tracked light armoured vehicle], as I would find out.13
So we were out of the immediate threat, at least I saw we had this 
metal around us. I know when we got in the vehicle Captain Mramor 
was very happy, saying, ‘We made it! We made it!’ And a couple other 
individuals, they had smiles on their faces. But I wasn’t sharing that 
enthusiasm at that time because I thought, ‘Well, we’re in this vehicle 
which is reassuring, however we’re far from out of the threat.’ And over 
the course of time, I could hear pinging off the side, which I suspected 
were rounds hitting it and whatnot, so the threat was still very real.
We were in the vehicle and basically waiting, and that’s when I gained 
an appreciation of what had just happened. My gloves were destroyed. 
I had a spare set of gloves on me. I always keep a spare set, for times 
when I spill fuel on them or whatnot, in my lower pant leg, so I switched 
gloves. My hands were a little bit raw too from crawling, because I 
had holes in my gloves. I was just trying to gain my breath, and that’s 
the first time I realised how dehydrated I was. I could barely talk, or 
swallow, my mouth was so dry. Because for that time, whether it was 
ten minutes or twenty-five minutes, I didn’t know, my adrenaline was 
going so fast, just with everything that was going on, just in the time 
we were engaged in the air to actually being in the vehicle. And I could 
barely swallow. I was just exasperated.
This vehicle was probably meant to carry four or five troops, and there 
was probably ten of us in there. I don’t know how many people there 
was, but it was very uncomfortable. But at that point, it was just 
‘pile in,’ it wasn’t about comfort. And I remember asking, there was a 
crewman there and he was sticking out the top, and I said, ‘Hey, is there 
anything to drink in here? Do you have any water or anything?’ And 
he said, ‘All we have is Red Bull.’ And I thought, ‘That’s probably the
13 M 1I3A3.
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worst thing I could drink right now, however anything wet in my mouth 
would help,’ so I said, ‘I’ll take one.’ So I drank a Red Bull, which was 
probably even worse for my heart rate, however just that sensation of 
wet in my mouth was great.
Then I remember starting to sit there, and thinking, ‘What is going on? 
Are we getting out of here?’ And once again, time appreciation is very 
difficult. And I didn’t want to bother him. Yes, I’m the aircraft captain 
and whatnot, but I’m out of my element now, and I’m not going to start 
barking orders. And I was being patient. But then I started getting a bit 
antsy, and I thought, ‘What is going on? You know, we’ve got to get out 
of here!’ So I remember popping up through the hatch, looking around, 
and I started snapping some photos by my second or third time I popped 
up. ... ‘Where’s our evacuation? Where are the Blackhawks, you know, 
the American Blackhawks, they have combat search and rescue. Are they 
coming to pick us up? When are we going to get out of here?’
And it wasn’t happening! I could see Griffons flying around. I thought 
I saw a Blackhawk flying around. There were troops moving around 
on the ground. I could see the helicopter burning, there wasn’t a lot 
left of it, clear as day. I got back down thinking, ‘I’m going to get 
shot up here.’ Back in the vehicle, another five, ten minutes. ‘Okay, 
I’m getting antsy again, I’ve got to get back up.’ My adrenaline is still 
going. I remember shaking, and you know, even hours later, I was still 
shaking, the adrenaline hadn’t settled yet. I must have gone up and 
down through that hatch about six times. And the ramp in the back 
had opened at one point and a couple of soldiers had come over. They 
were taking account of who was on board, and who was here, probably 
trying to determine who was alive, who wasn’t, and even I didn’t know 
at that point. I knew it was a lot of guys, but had somebody suffered 
critical injuries? I wasn’t too sure. The first goal was to get everybody 
out of harm’s way before taking account of what our injuries were and 
administering first aid or whatever. Everybody seemed pretty mobile, 
so I was confident that everybody got out of the aircraft. That made me 
feel like we did our job, we got it on the ground, people got out, but it 
was a bit chaotic after that.
So he had taken account of who was there, and asked names and 
whatnot, then he was gone. The ramp came up at that point. I believe, 
in my appreciation of time, we were probably there for an hour. And I
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was getting very antsy. I thought, like, ‘What are we doing here? This 
is ridiculous. We’ve got to get out of here. Where are our helicopters?’ 
But nobody had information. But I remember, eventually at one point, 
someone saying, ‘We’re going back to Ma’sum Ghar.’ And I thought, 
‘What?’ And that caused my adrenaline to spike again. Because I 
thought, ‘If we’re going back to a FOB, that means we’re going in this 
vehicle, which means we’re on the roads.’ And now I thought about 
those 140 some-odd Canadians who had lost their lives and, you know, 
how many had been accounted for by IEDs, and that made me very 
nervous. I thought, ‘We just survived everything we’d gone through, so 
far, and we may not make it!’ I remember the vehicle starting up, and it 
was good to get away from the rounds that were going off around us, that 
were hitting the vehicle. I thought, ‘This is going to be nerve-wracking.’
So we were in that vehicle and told we were going to that FOB, so I 
got nervous again. Then I felt the vehicle start moving. Everybody was 
inside. I think there was one of the operators who was up through the 
hatch though. And that was a very nerve-wracking drive. I felt the 
vehicle come to a stop and then start accelerating again, and turning 
corners, and I was bracing myself, sitting there, waiting for a ‘Kaboom!’ 
because I was thinking about what I saw on the news and all the IEDs 
and whatnot. It seemed like probably about a fifteen- to twenty-minute 
drive, and then we came to a stop, and then the hatch went down, 
and everybody started getting out, and I thought, ‘We’re in the FOB.’ 
So there was my first sense of relief in that whole incident. I kind of 
felt like, ‘At least we’re in a FOB. There’s a lot of soldiers around us, 
fortified walls, lookouts.’ I felt good. And we were in Ma’sum Ghar, the 
place we’d just taken off from.
That was the first time where I actually felt a bit of relief. But at 
the same time, I got very emotional. I remember thinking, ‘I want 
to cry. I can’t believe we just went through this.’ I wanted to go to a 
corner somewhere. (I never really shared that with a lot of people.) ... 
There was a couple of hugs with the few crew members who were there, 
because it was multiple vehicles out there and they came in over time. 
Ten minutes later another vehicle came in and a couple more crew 
members got out. But I remember thinking at that point, ‘I just can’t 
believe what we went through, and that we actually survived it.’ And 
it became emotional for me. Looking and seeing a little open area off 
to the side of the camp, I thought I just wanted to go over there and
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cry just to accept what had happened. And I didn’t, you know, bravado 
and whatever, but I know I was very emotional at the time. I was still 
shaking ... the adrenaline was still going. And I don’t know if it had 
been an hour or two hours or two-and-a-half at that point, once again 
you lose track of time. I wasn’t looking at my watch.
Things started winding down at that point. They had very quickly 
established a triage so they could get everybody in and take a look at 
everybody just to see how everybody’s well-being was. I remember we 
had to drop all our bags and they were calling us in, ‘You, you and you, 
come inside.’ I remember sitting on a gurney and someone coming over 
and asking us some questions, blood pressure and everything, ‘Does 
anything hurt?’ I remember saying, ‘Yeah, my back’s really sore, my 
neck hurts, my jaw hurts.’ I felt like one of my teeth was broken. My knee 
was hurting me a lot and I was shaking, obviously. And those were the 
major things I was feeling at the time. And as my adrenaline started going 
down, I could start feeling the pain a bit more. They just asked us some 
questions, and we were in there for about twenty minutes. They asked 
‘What happened?’ and whatnot. They gave me a bottle of ibuprofen, and 
I asked, ‘What’s that for?’ And they said, ‘You’re going to need it in the 
next few days, because as your adrenaline settles, your muscles have all 
tensed so much that everything is going to be very achy.’ And they were 
right. Going into the next day and the day after, the body was fairly achy 
just from everything that had tensed up at different times.
I left the tent and sat down, once again getting very impatient. ‘When 
are we getting out of here?’ I just wanted to get back to Kandahar with 
the personnel I knew and my boss and the troops around us. I took a 
phone call there. I was told, ‘Hey, the commanding officer called, he 
wants you to call him.’ So I went into another tent, was pointed to a 
phone, given a number, called, and gave a quick assessment of what 
had happened to my commanding officer at the time who was back 
at Kandahar Airfield in the operations centre. He said that a Chinook 
would be coming to get us. That made me nervous again! I said, ‘Okay 
boss.’ I didn’t know how I could get into an aircraft and fly again given 
what had happened. It was the first time I thought this, that I didn’t 
want to get in a Chinook right now. It made me a bit nervous, but I 
didn’t want to stay in the FOB either, because the FOB’s in a bad area 
too, it’s in the ‘Green Zone.’
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I had a little bit to eat, though I wasn’t hungry at all. I think I had a 
piece of bread. ... I talked with a bit of the crew about what happened 
and took a few pictures and whatnot. And over the course of the next 
couple of hours, I believe we just tried to relax as much as we could. We 
were told the Chinook was inbound. About ten or fifteen minutes later, 
a Chinook landed. We were all gathering our gear, then we went and got 
on that Chinook. I saw the escorts flying around. I sat down. And the 
Chinook took off, started heading airborne, climbing up, getting some 
altitude. I still had my flying helmet on and whatnot, and somebody 
came back, one of the crew members, and yelled that the pilot wants to 
talk to you. So I plugged in the intercom and he said, ‘Hey, it’s Major 
McKenna [Chris, Officer Commanding Chinook Flight, CHF(A)]. 
How’s it going man?’ And I said, ‘Good boss.’ He was my supervisor, 
and he said, ‘I’m glad you guys are alright. What’s the extent, what’s 
going on injury-wise? What’s the extent?’ Listening to a doctor and a 
warrant officer talk in triage, one of them thought there were three cat c 
[category C] injuries, which is non-critical, minor injuries. One thought 
there was eight cat c injuries, and then someone else said they thought 
everybody has a cat c injury, you know, all twenty-one on board. So I 
said, ‘Well Maj, you know, I’m not 100 percent sure.’ He said, ‘Well as 
far as I’m concerned then, you guys are all going to the hospital to get 
checked out.’ I said, ‘Okay.’ And I said, ‘If you don’t mind Maj, can 
you drop me off at the Air Wing?’14 I just wanted to be back with my 
element, that’s where my comfort zone was, because I felt okay, more 
or less. He said, ‘No, sorry dude. I got to send you over to Role Three 
[the hospital at KAF].’ So we headed back to the base. Again it was 
nerve-wracking, having just been in a Chinook and flying and been shot 
down as I could best piece it together at that point. We got back to the 
airfield and just basically started making our way through the medical 
system. And it was a bit chaotic to say the least. I won’t get into much 
detail, but it was far from a well-oiled machine.
14 The Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing, Canada’s air assets deployed in 
theatre, consisting of helicopters (CH-147D Chinook and CH-146 Griffon), tactical 
transport aircraft (CC-130 Hercules), unmanned aerial vehicles (CU-170 Heron), and 
leased / chartered Mi-8 transport helicopters.
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When I think back, it really didn’t matter what had brought us down 
or what had hit us. I didn’t want to get into too many discussions or 
debates about this. It didn’t really matter. Because as a pilot, I can’t 
concentrate on what just happened. What’s going to happen next? [is 
where I have to be mentally]. And that’s something that we’re trained 
to do ... don’t worry about the past, but you’ve got to worry about the 
future. Instead of focusing and worrying about why the aircraft wasn’t 
functioning or what had happened— did we hit something? did something 
hit us?— it was a matter of, ‘Okay. I need to get this aircraft on the 
ground and save some lives so we can all walk away from this, or things 
are going to get worse before better.’ In a nutshell, that’s about it.
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